What a short, strange trip it’s been for Donald Trump’s conservative supporters. Ever since the Goldwaterite takeover of the GOP, the party has tried to convert voters to conservatism. This orientation has sometimes led it to follow a “better to be right and lose” axiom — hence Goldwater’s disastrous defeat in 1964. Now we seem to have tipped in the other direction, thinking it’s “better to be wrong and win.”
George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism” was seen as a nod in this direction, and a great many conservatives — myself included — were critical of his efforts to triangulate against traditional limited-government conservatism.
After Barack Obama’s election, the Republican party lurched toward purity. The tea parties were a revolt not only against Obama’s leftism but also, belatedly, against the perceived apostasies of Bush, as well as John McCain.
In 2009, then-senator Jim DeMint declared he’d rather have 30 reliable conservatives in the Senate than 60 unreliable ones. Ted Cruz launched his presidential campaign on the premise that deviation from pure conservatism cost Republicans the 2012 election. The only way to win was to refuse to compromise and instead give voters a clear choice. Many of the right’s most vocal ideological enforcers cheered him on.Until Trump started winning. Suddenly, the emphasis wasn’t on winning through purer conservatism but on winning at any cost.
Consider Larry Kudlow and Stephen Moore. In August, the two legendarily libertarian-minded economists attacked Trump, focusing on what they called Trump’s “Fortress America platform.” His trade policies threaten the global economic order, they warned. “We can’t help wondering whether the recent panic in world financial markets is in part a result of the Trump assault on free trade,” they mused. As for Trump’s immigration policies, they could “hardly be further from the Reagan vision of America as a ‘shining city on a hill.’”
Months later, as Trump rose in the polls, Kudlow and Moore joined the ranks of Trump’s biggest boosters — and not because Trump changed his views. On the contrary, Kudlow has moved markedly in Trump’s direction. He now argues that the borders must be sealed and all visas canceled. He also thinks we have to crack down on China.
What explains such Pauline conversions on the road to a Trump presidency? One argument they and many other converts make is purely consequentialist. “For me, Trump potentially represents a big expansion of the Republican Party, a way to bring in those blue-collar Reagan Democrats,” Moore told the Washington Post. “That’s necessary if the party is going to win again.”Lost in the discussion is any effort to win a mandate for conservative policies, other than an impossible crackdown on immigration (and even on this Trump has acknowledged that he would be more “flexible” than initially advertised). Instead of converting voters to conservatism, Trump is succeeding at converting conservatives to statism on everything from health care and entitlements to trade.
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this sorry state of affairs is that many conservatives have been arguing for years that we must update Republican policies to help the very people Trump is now winning over through ideologically haphazard and substance-free demagoguery. Indeed, a diverse group of intellectuals associated with the Conservative Reform Network and the journal National Affairs developed a host of policies that apply Reaganite principles to today’s problems.
As Ramesh Ponnuru (my colleague at the American Enterprise Institute and National Review) has argued, cutting top marginal tax rates were a priority when President Reagan took office in 1980 because they were at 70 percent. Now they’re at 39.6 percent, so maybe other forms of tax relief should take priority? For instance, Ponnuru has championed beefed-up child tax credits to help struggling families raise the next generation of taxpayers.
Reformocons, as they’re sometimes called, were trying to find a way to grow the party without abandoning Reaganite principles. For their efforts, they were dismissed as apostates. Kudlow and Moore heaped scorn on reformocon ideas. Rush Limbaugh, for his part, dismissed reform conservatism as “capitulation” to liberalism.
The irony is that reform conservatives almost uniformly oppose Trump’s populist deformation of conservatism, and the former purists are now calling for unity behind the Mother of all Capitulations, rationalized by Trump’s promise to win, conservatism be damned.
Optimists see those changes as major factors driving current political trends in some countries. In Turkey, factions within the urban middle class have resisted the creeping authoritarianism of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In Argentina, a large and relatively resilient middle class contributed to the recent defeat of former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s handpicked successor, rejecting the costs of continued economic populism. And perhaps it’s no accident that Tunisia—where about 30 percent of the population belongs to the middle class (a very large proportion compared with most of the Arab world)—is the only country to have emerged from the Arab revolts of 2010–11 with something resembling democratic rule.
SOFT IN THE MIDDLE
The trouble is that the ongoing conversion of economic gains into political progress requires continued growth, and the global slowdown now threatens that process. Middle classes in Brazil, urban China, and Turkey are big but still new; the endurance of the political and social benefits they have provided depends on their institutionalization over the long term and the adoption of customs and rules that take a long time to harden into habits. A prolonged downturn in growth will complicate things in those countries—far more so than in the United States and western Europe, where middle classes are suffering but the institutions built around them are well established and relatively strong.
In most emerging markets, high growth during the last decade depended on commodity exports and low interest rates. High profits and easy credit created retail and public-service jobs for graduates of secondary schools but did not necessarily raise productivity in manufacturing and large-scale agriculture. The economist Dani Rodrik worries about what he calls “premature deindustrialization” in the developing world, given that manufacturing—the setting for the productivity increases and struggles between labor and capital that helped produce democratic politics in the West—has already peaked at 15 percent of employment in Brazil and India, far lower than the 30 percent level found in South Korea in the late 1980s. The fear is that the new middle classes will be hit hard if it turns out that global growth was built too much on easy credit and commodity booms and too little on the productivity gains that raise incomes and living standards for everyone.
If the middle class and those struggling to join it see their incomes stagnate or fall, they are less likely to support the economic and regulatory policies that over time increase the size of the overall economic pie. Instead, they are likely to embrace short-term, populist measures they believe will help them retain their gains and meet their raised expectations. In short, slow growth (or, worse, an economic collapse) could erode middle-class support for good governance, a broad social contract, and the economic reforms that sustain the opportunities on which the middle class depends.
Brazil might prove vulnerable to that dynamic. When the economy was growing rapidly and steadily, the middle class supported President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s impressive program of cash transfers to the very poor. Although most middle-class families responded to weak public schooling by sending their children to private schools, they did not resist educational reforms to improve public schooling. In leaner times, however, a beleaguered middle class might be less tolerant of programs that benefit the poor and the working class and might politically ally itself with the rich instead. A similar shift could occur in every country with a large but relatively new middle class.
It takes several decades to develop and solidify the responsive state institutions that the middle class wants and on which it relies. And even then, a large middle class does not guarantee that democratic institutions can survive hard times. Germany in the 1920s and 1930s provides the quintessential cautionary tale. Devastated by the country’s defeat in World War I and suffering from runaway inflation, the German economy tanked, robbing the middle class of the sense of security that had bound it to the common good and opening the door to dangerous populism, Nazi demagoguery, and, finally, autocracy and the genocidal scapegoating of the Jews.
PROTECTING FRAGILE GAINS
In a hyperconnected global economy, lower growth in China, Japan, and Europe and economic fragility in Brazil and other big emerging markets spell trouble everywhere. To avoid the worst outcomes, countries with emerging middle classes cannot take shortcuts. That means eschewing irresponsible fiscal policies and other missteps that could generate inflation and hurt everyone. Developing countries should also consider reforming their health-care, pension, and unemployment programs, which underpin citizens’ confidence in a secure future—not only within growing middle classes but also among people who have escaped absolute poverty and now aspire to middle-class security and status. Above all, middle classes in developing countries would benefit from reforms to educational systems and increased investment in infrastructure. Good schools and roads offer high returns to everyone, but they especially encourage private investment and bring the productivity gains on which middle classes build and prosper.
High-income countries can also play a role in building middle-class societies in the developing world. Development aid is not enough, however, as it ultimately has a minimal effect in recipient countries. Wealthy countries should instead focus on removing the obstacles they have created to healthy, productivity-driven growth—by cracking down on tax avoidance and evasion on the part of major multinationals, which reduce tax revenue in developing countries; by fixing privacy laws that have made it too easy to hide stolen assets abroad; by enforcing antibribery rules; by ending protectionist policies in agriculture and textiles; and by improving the management of their immigration systems.
Rich individuals and corporations can also do their part by continuing to create new opportunities around the world, especially through investment in new technologies. Brazil’s huge middle class, concentrated in the country’s south, is in part the product of public and corporate research and investment that dramatically increased the region’s yields of soy, apples, and other crops. Mobile technology is helping create middle-class opportunities in poor countries. And the philanthropist Bill Gates’ recent launch of a $2 billion initiative to research and develop clean energy will indirectly create new green industries and jobs for middle-class workers everywhere.
None of those steps, of course, will completely offset the ill effects that long-term stagnation might have on the world’s burgeoning middle classes. Only strong growth can do that. But doing nothing at all would risk allowing the world’s new middle classes—one of the most hopeful developments of the past 30 years—to turn into a source of division and instability.

