Today in 1956, Elvis Presley signed a seven-year contract with Paramount Studios.
The movies won no Academy Awards, but sold a lot of tickets and a lot of records.
The number one album today in 1968 was the soundtrack to “The Graduate”:
Today in 1956, Elvis Presley signed a seven-year contract with Paramount Studios.
The movies won no Academy Awards, but sold a lot of tickets and a lot of records.
The number one album today in 1968 was the soundtrack to “The Graduate”:
These are confusing times to be a Republican.
For the past several decades, members of the GOP have mapped the ideological range found within their party onto a fairly straightforward spectrum—one that runs from “moderate” to “conservative.” The formulation was simplistic, of course, but it provided a useful shorthand in assessing politicians, and in explaining one’s own political orientation.
A small-government culture warrior in Arizona would be situated on the far-right end of the spectrum; a pro-choice Chamber of Commerce type in Massachusetts might place himself on the other end. And across the country, there were millions of people—from officeholders to ordinary Republican voters—who identified somewhere between those two poles.
But with the rise of Donald Trump—and his spectrum-bending brand of populist nationalism—many longtime Republicans are now struggling to figure out where they fit in this fast-shifting philosophical landscape. In recent weeks, two prominent Republicans have told me they are sincerely struggling to explain where they fall on the ideological spectrum these days. It’s not that they’ve changed their beliefs; it’s that the old taxonomy has become incoherent.
For example, does being an outspoken Trump critic make you a “moderate” RINO? Does it matter whether you’re criticizing him for an overly austere healthcare bill, or for a reckless infrastructure spending plan? And who owns the “far right” now—is it “constitutional conservatives” like Ted Cruz, or “alt-right” white supremacists like Richard Spencer?
When I raised these questions on Twitter earlier this week, I was swamped with hundreds of responses and dozens of emails from longtime Republicans who described feeling like they are lost inside their own homes.
Some, like Jordan Team from Washington, D.C., related how their attempts at explaining their personal politics have devolved into a kind of absurdist comedy:
I’ve always identified as a more moderate R—even”establishment Republican”, if you will. I usually always use “moderate” or “Establishment” when saying I’m a Republican to separate myself from more hard-line Tea Party Freedom Caucus conservatives.
These days, however, I feel like it requires even further explanation to separate myself from the nationalism/populism that Trump & team espouse, since they’re all now technically Republicans. Usually it’s something super catchy & brief along the lines of: “I’m a moderate Republican—or at least, have been one, not really sure that that means anymore—but I don’t support Trump or populism—I’m traditionally conservative.” And even that doesn’t always get the point across. I think the easiest when trying to have a conversation with someone is a two step process. Step 1: “I’m a Republican but don’t like Trump,” and then if the convo keeps going/they know politics/they’re interested, there’s step 2: “I’m more moderate/establishment than Tea Party/Freedom Caucus.”Other people, meanwhile, shared more tragic testimonials. “I feel honestly like a part of my identity was stolen,” wrote Alycia Kuehne, a conservative Christian from Dallas, Texas.
But virtually everyone who wrote to me shared a common complaint: The traditional “Left ↔ Right” spectrum used to describe and categorize Republicans has become obsolete in the age of Trump. The question now is what to replace it with.To provoke interesting answers, I asked people who wrote to me to imagine the Republican voter who is furthest from themselves—be it ideologically, philosophically, or attitudinally—and then to answer the question: What is the most meaningful difference between you and that person?The proposed spectrums that emerged from their responses—some of which I’ve included below—are not meant to be peer-reviewed by political scientists. But they offer new, and potentially more useful, ways to map the emerging fault lines that now divide the American right. LIBERTARIAN ↔ AUTHORITARIAN: One of the most common responses I received from Republicans argued that the party could be divided between authoritarians (who tend to gravitate toward Trump) and libertarians (who are generally repelled by his strong-man instincts). In an email that was typical of several I received, Aaron L. M. Goodwin, from California, wrote:
I grew up in a pretty conservative household. We were home-schooled Mormons. We listened to conservative talk radio. I was the only 10-year-old I knew of who loved to watch C-Span. These days I feel completely alienated from the GOP. But, I don’t feel like I’m the one who sold out. So where does that leave me?
I believe the conservative/liberal spectrum has been overtaken by one for democratic/authoritarian … Most of the Republicans I still feel some kinship with are from a multitude of ideologies, but they share an ideology based on classical liberal democracy. We all share a deep-seeded suspicion of rule by power, and I believe, are closer to the original intent of our founding documents.
GRIEVANCE-MOTIVATED ↔ PHILOSOPHICALLY MOTIVATED: Liz Mair, a libertarian-leaning GOP strategist, wrote that she’s been convinced after “300 gazillion conversations with all sorts of conservatives”—including a range of lawmakers, writers, pundits, candidates, and grassroots-level activists—that the biggest division within the party is one that separates Fox News-a-holics driven by tribal grievance from people who have some kind of philosophically rooted belief system:
I honestly think the split in conservatism comes more down to philosophy versus identity politics than anything. Are you opposed to things on philosophical or tribal grounds? Are you a believer or a member of our clan? (Said in the Scottish sense) …
I bet if you polled Trump primary voters and asked them what was the bigger problem—insufficiently limited government or transgender Muslim feminists being celebrated at the Oscars, a big majority would say the latter.
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ↔ ESTABLISHMENT: The outsider/insider trope is well-worn in contemporary conservative politics—so much so that you could argue the terms have lost their meaning. But based on the emails I received, many Republicans (on both ends of the spectrum) still view the party through that lens. On one end are people who respect existing political institutions, and believe in conforming to their norms and using the system to advance their agenda. On other end of this spectrum are people who believe the establishment is hopelessly corrupt and ineffectual, and that it should be circumvented whenever possible.
The flaw in this formulation, it seems to me, is that virtually every Republican who has entered Congress over the past eight years started out on the anti-establishment end of the spectrum, and then slid—involuntarily, perhaps, but inevitably—toward the establishment end. That’s because, as Stephen Spiker from Virginia emailed, once you run for office and win, you necessarily become a part of the system, an insider:
I see many colleagues in the party taken in by the “establishment vs anti-establishment” spectrum. Essentially populism, as the anti-establishment folks are “burn it down” because they don’t feel represented and want a fighter. That lead to Dave Brat winning in 2014, and Trump winning in 2016.
Now that it’s Trump vs Brat, you’re going to see the inherent decay in this school of thought: the anti-establishment crowd turning on their former heroes like Dave Brat (as they turned on Cantor previously). He’s in Congress, he’s an insider, he’s standing in the way, etc.
It will eventually turn on Trump as well, as he falls short on goal after goal. When it happens (as in, before or after Trump is out of office) is always dependent on having the right person run at the right time on the right message, but it will happen.
Most notable about the anti-establishment position is that there’s no consistent end game or policy goal. It exists for the sake of itself. That’s what frustrates folks who actually have firm ideological stances.
ABSOLUTISTS ↔ DEALMAKERS: Many of the most high-profile intra-party battles in recent years have been fought not over ideas, but tactics and a willingness to compromise. While Republicans in Washington were essentially unanimous in their opposition to President Obama’s agenda, they differed—at least at first—over whether they should cut deals at the legislative bargaining table, or, say, shut the government down until they got exactly what they wanted. The absolutists largely won out during the Obama presidency—but what about now? On one end of this spectrum are people like the Freedom Caucus purists from whom it is all but impossible to extract concessions; on the other are the dealmakers who will compromise virtually anything to get some kind of legislation passed.
Several Republicans who wrote to me were, I think, circling this idea, which my colleague Conor Friedersdorf recently articulated:
Do populist Republicans want a federal government where politicians stand on principle and refuse to compromise? Or do they want a pragmatist to make fabulous deals?
… Is a GOP House member more likely to be punished in a primary for thwarting a Donald Trump deal … or compromising to make a deal happen? Were I the political consultant for an ambitious primary candidate in a safe Republican district, I can imagine a successful challenge regardless of what course the incumbent chose, voters having been primed to respond to either critique.
OPEN/TOLERANT ↔ NATIVIST/RACIST: This is the probably the most provocative construct that was proposed, but it was also a popular one. For many Trump-averse Republicans, one of the biggest perceived differences between themselves and hardcore Trump fans is attitudes toward racial minorities and foreign immigrants. The alt-right dominates one end of the spectrum—and they place themselves on the polar opposite end.
Granted, this spectrum was not proposed to me by any Trump supporters, and no doubt many of them would strongly disagree with this categorization. But there’s no question it’s one of the defining debates inside the party right now. Evan McMullin, a conservative who ran for president last year under the #NeverTrump banner, was quoted in October saying that racism was the single biggest problem with the party.
* * *
This is, of course, by no means a comprehensive list of the divisions within the GOP. For example, one of the most talked-about conflicts to emerge in the past year has been between “nationalism” and “globalism.” But despite efforts by Steve Bannon and other Trump advisers to frame the ideological debate that way, very few GOP voters—at least none who wrote to me—identify as “globalists.” Instead, these new spectrums represent a few of the ways in which Republicans—eager to escape the disorder and confusion of the Trump era—are categorizing themselves and each other.
The term not in Coppins’ piece that I use to label myself more than anything is “conservatarian.” I believe in smaller government than The Donald does. Really small government. (As in state government half the size it is in Wisconsin today.) But libertarians can be naïve about this country’s proper role in the rest of the world. Nature abhors a vacuum, but political power is attracted to a vacuum. Unless you think Vladimir Putin should be more prominent than an American president, this country needs to participate in the rest of the world.
I am turned off by Trump supporters’ nativism, and I believe a lot of Trump supporters are as much sycophants as Barack Obama’s most die-hard toadies. That is not to say that Trump supporters are racist, because the left has defined the term “racism” so far downward as to make it meaningless when there are actual instances of racism in our world. (Here’s a tip: If your opinion about someone is defined by their skin color or their ethnic background, you’re a bigot; if your opinion about someone is defined by how they act or what they say, you’re not.)
The whole Establishment vs. Not thing can be summed up best by saying that while you have to work within the system to get political things accomplished, you should not be of the system, and you don’t have to support the existence of the system even if you acknowledge its reality. There will always be an Establishment, but it should be based on merit, not political power. (Business is usually superior to government because business owners have to earn what they get.)
After the failure comes the brave talk: President Trump declares war on the House Freedom Caucus and tweets out that “Anybody (especially Fake News media) who thinks that Repeal & Replace of ObamaCare is dead does not know the love and strength in R Party.”
Actually, there isn’t much evidence there’s a lot of either love or strength in the GOP these days. But, since making predictions is a dicey proposition in the Trump era, it’s possible that the Trump-Ryan bill is merely mostly dead, rather than thoroughly demised.
Even so, the focus on the recalcitrant Freedom Caucus misses five major dynamics that seem unlikely to change: (1) the House GOP healthcare bill was killed not just by hardline conservatives, but also by moderates, (2) whatever happens in the House, it is still DOA in the Senate, (3) only 17 percent of Americans think it’s a good idea, (4) Republicans have never before succeeded in repealing or dramatically changing a middle-class entitlement once it has been implemented, and (5) Trump himself remains woefully ignorant of the details of the bill and largely indifferent to the policy itself.
Meanwhile, Trump is embroiled in multiple investigations, chronic chaos and dysfunction, and has an approval rating of around 35 percent, a number that does not incentivize Democrats to bail him out or Republicans to quail in fear of his displeasure.
In this environment, passing healthcare legislation is the political equivalent of a Rubik’s cube and there is no indication that the feat is being attempted by geniuses. Mark Twain (or perhaps Abraham Maslow) once noted that “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” Trump is a man with a Twitter account, who thinks every problem can be solved with a tweet.
The result is a case study in political incoherence. In the days following the humiliating failure on healthcare, Trump World (led by Breitbart) waged a bizarre two-front war, simultaneously attacking both Speaker of the House Paul Ryan (who supported the bill) and the conservatives who opposed it (because they had defied the president).
It’s hard to see how this ends well, because for his presidency to succeed, Trump needs his base united behind him. By lashing out at fellow Republicans he is picking exactly the wrong fight.
This has also created a dilemma for the shills: Trump-friendly media outlets faced a painful (and yet somehow familiar) choice of siding with Trump or the conservative groups who they have championed for years. (Sean Hannity’s contortions have been a wonder to behold.)
But this isn’t all Trump’s fault. The truth is that the GOP healthcare bill died from pre-existing conditions.Long before Trump descended the golden escalator and announced his presidential bid, the right had become dominated by a perpetual outrage machine, roiling the already unsettled waters of political anger and alienation on the Right. Republicans, who had become adept at opposition politics, often played along, repeatedly over-promising their ability to roll back Obama-era policies.
Ironically, this helped give us Trump, despite his ideological incompatibility with many of the conservative groups pushing for more ideological purity. So, not surprisingly, his election didn’t solve the GOP’s internal problems, especially since it is hard to flip from shrill oppositionalism to the more mundane business of actual governance.
It did not help that the legislation, with its massive tax cuts for the rich and benefit cuts for the poor and middle class, seemed to be a product of what Bill Kristol colorfully calls “zombie conservatism.”
The result is that the GOP options range from bad to horrible:
- They can try to push it through the House, only to watch it die in the Senate and create an electoral nightmare in 2018.
- They can move on to the rest of the GOP agenda, and hope that the public blames Democrats for the continuing failures of Obamacare. But this means abandoning a promise that Republicans have made for more than 7 years.
- Trump can administratively undermine Obamacare. But, the iron rule here is that if you broke it, you own it.
- As unlikely as it may be, Trump could also try to work with the Democrats on a compromise. But, as Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has made quite clear, any deal requires the GOP to give up any plans to repeal or weaken Obamacare. In other words, the price of compromise is unilateral surrender. That would mean that the GOP would simply break its promise and fail to repeal the law, it would mean that Trump (and the GOP) would explicitly embrace and ratify Obamacare.
- Finally, Trump could return to the faith of his youth and move hard-left, embracing single-payer. A leading pro-Trump intellectual, F. H. Buckley, is now urging Trump to do precisely that.
Short of a full-on meltdown of his presidency, it’s hard to envision Trump making such a radical move. But what it lacks in plausibility, it would more than make up in the entertainment value of watching Limbaugh, Coulter, and Hannity try to spin it.
The number one album today in 1980 was Genesis’ “Duke”:
Today in 1985, more than 5,000 radio stations played this at 3:50 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time, which is 9:50 a.m. Central time (but Standard or Daylight?):
Last week the Commerce Department released its third revision for fourth-quarter 2016 gross domestic product. The number came in at a paltry 2.1 percent, meaning that growth during President Obama’s final year in office — the end of an “Error of Hope” — landed with a big thud at just 1.6 percent.
That low-water mark puts the Obama presidency in last place among all the post-World War II presidents when it comes to economic growth.
There have been 13 post-WWII presidents, beginning with Harry Truman, who had the disadvantage of beginning in the aftermath of war in 1946, during which the economy contracted 11.6 percent — four times the contraction any other negative year since — and even he bested Obama’s economic record!
Truman, a moderate Democrat, also posted the two best years of growth on record: 1950 at 8.7 percent and 1951 at 8 percent, and there was no zero percent interest rate to gin up the economy back then.
Thirteenth of 13 presidents is no mild distinction. Obama had eight full years to enact a growth policy, while many of his predecessors never had two complete terms. George H.W. Bush and Jimmy Carter had just four years each, Gerald Ford had less than three years and Richard Nixon had five.
I’m not the least bit surprised the Obama economy was a failure. I’ve chronicled it for more than seven years in this column.
Here are the average growth rates for each president:
- Johnson (1964-68), 5.3 percent
- Kennedy (1961-63), 4.3 percent
- Clinton (1993-2000), 3.9 percent
- Reagan (1981-88), 3.5 percent
- Carter (1977-80), 3.3 percent
- Eisenhower (1953-60), 3 percent
- Nixon (1969-74), 2.8 percent
- Ford (1975-76), 2.6 percent
- G.H.W. Bush (1989-92), 2.3 percent
- G.W. Bush (2001-08), 2.1 percent
- Truman (1946-52), 1.7 percent
- Obama (2009-16), 1.6 percent
Truman? Go back farther:
With Thursday’s final revision of fourth-quarter GDP growth to 2.1 percent from its previous 1.9 percent level, President Obama is the only president since Herbert Hoover to not have guided the US economy to 3 percent growth in any year he was in office. …
Obama’s best year, as far as growing the economy, was 2015 when it grew 2.6 percent from 2014 — after growing 2.4 percent that year from 2013.
The recovering economy — and steady job growth — gave Obama lots of momentum, but the economy sputtered again last year, Commerce reported Thursday.
The government attributed the upward revision in fourth quarter GDP to higher than expected consumer spending in the October-December period.
But even with the upward revision, the US economy was in no danger of achieving 3 percent or better growth last year.
Why is 3 percent growth important? Real Clear Markets explained last year:
From 1790 to 2000, U.S. RGDP growth averaged 3.79%. America needs at least 3.0% economic growth-the nation cannot defend itself and pay its bills without it. However, America’s elites have largely given up on growth, and are now distracting themselves with academic musings about “secular stagnation.”
If you’re being compared to Herbert Hoover, you were bad on the economy.
Today in 1960, RCA Victor Records announced it would release all singles in both mono and stereo.
Today in 1964, the Beatles had 14 of the Billboard Top 100 singles, including the top five:
The Legislature’s Joint Finance Committee will have the first of its public hearings on the 2017–19 state budget at UW–Platteville this morning.
The reality of the budget process is that the budget will be decided by legislative Republicans’ votes and Gov. Scott Walker’s vetoes. Legislative Democrats will say a lot, but will have no influence on what becomes law around July 1.
That’s because, the Wall Street Journal reports, Democratic influence in state politics has faded like lawn furniture left out all year:
Six years ago, as a bitter winter gripped the Upper Midwest, Wisconsin Democrats mobilized for a major political protest. Demonstrators packed the streets of Madison tighter than a playoff game at Lambeau Field. They descended upon the Capitol in the tens of thousands to oppose Republican Gov. Scott Walker’s Act 10, which would curtail the influence of the state’s powerful public-employee unions.
Some thought those snowy protests would launch a Democratic surge in Wisconsin. Instead they appear to have marked the beginning of the party’s decline. Since 2011 Wisconsin Republicans have been on a winning streak.
In the state Assembly, Republicans enjoy their largest majority since 1957. Twenty of the 33 seats in the state Senate belong to the GOP, the most since 1970. Mr. Walker, who easily survived a recall election in 2012, won a new term in 2014. Last November voters rejected Democrat Russ Feingold’s bid to reclaim the Senate seat he lost in 2010 to Republican Ron Johnson. Remarkably, Donald Trump won Wisconsin’s 10 electoral votes—the first GOP presidential candidate to do so since Ronald Reagan in 1984.
The latest evidence of Democrats’ sorry slide is the election next Tuesday for a seat on Wisconsin’s Supreme Court. Only six years after their historic demonstrations against Act 10, Democrats couldn’t find a single candidate willing to run against conservative Justice Annette Ziegler in her bid for another 10-year term.
A spokesman for the state’s Democratic Party told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in January that “a number of people” considered opposing Justice Ziegler before ultimately deciding not to take the plunge. Considering Wisconsin’s political history as an incubator of 20th-century progressivism, this development is rather stunning. “The Democratic Party has done a terrible job,” Glendale Mayor Bryan Kennedy told the Journal Sentinel. “We haven’t built the kind of infrastructure that says to a Supreme Court candidate, ‘We can help you.’ ”
The trend, though, goes back to the turn of the millennium. In Supreme Court races that pit a conservative against a liberal, voters seem to prefer the conservative virtually every time. In 2000 Diane Sykes —now a federal judge, whom President Trump has floated as a candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court—beat progressive Louis Butler for a seat on Wisconsin’s Supreme Court. Four years later, when Justice Sykes left for the federal bench, Democratic Gov. Jim Doyle appointed Mr. Butler to the vacancy anyway. But when voters had their say in 2008, they again rejected him in favor of conservative Michael Gableman.
Ms. Sykes’s win in 2000 began an incredible run of conservative victories in competitive Supreme Court races. Today only two reliable liberal justices remain on the court of seven.
Wisconsin progressives have scrambled to explain away the conservative ascendancy. “Big business,” they claim, has swayed court races with large contributions to third-party campaign organizations that promote conservatives.But Democratic-aligned groups have spent millions on behalf of their favored court candidates. In 2011, the liberal Greater Wisconsin Committee put $1.6 million into ads in the last two weeks of the race between conservative Justice David Prosser and liberal JoAnne Kloppenburg, more than any single pro-Prosser group spent. Mr. Prosser eked out a victory anyway, even amid the political storm raging over Gov. Walker’s labor reforms.
Ms. Kloppenburg was later elected to a lower-court seat, but a year ago this April she lost another race for the Supreme Court. Conservative Justice Rebecca Bradley weathered a storm of her own, fending off brutal attacks that dredged up newspaper columns she had written 24 years earlier as a student at Marquette University. Justice Bradley prevailed 52% to 47%, solidifying conservatives’ 5-2 majority.
On election night, Justice Bradley concluded her victory speech with a paraphrase from Winston Churchill: “There is nothing more exhilarating than being shot at without result.” If that’s the case, Wisconsin conservatives have a lot to be exhilarated about. Even more so now that the state’s Democrats are so deeply demoralized that they appear to have given up on shooting altogether.
The article doesn’t mention the typical Democratic complaint about redistricting, which is a complaint about the same system Democrats used to redistrict the Legislature after the 1982 gubernatorial election. Whether you call it redistricting or gerrymandering, that fails to explain the aforementioned Supreme Court wins, nor Walker’s three wins, nor U.S. Sen. Ron Johnson’s two wins over ex-Sen. Russ Feingold (D–California — oops, Wisconsin). It’s safe to say that 2016 was about as complete a disaster as possible for state Democrats, beginning with the primary election one year ago.
Wisconsin Democrats’ news got worse late last week, when three potential candidates for governor — former Sen. Tim Cullen, businessman Mark Bakken and former Green Bay Packer Mark Tauscher — all announced they’re not interested in running for governor as Democrats. That adds to such previously reported Democrats declining to run as U.S. Rep. Ron Kind (D–La Crosse), state Sen. Jennifer Shilling (D–La Crosse), state Rep. Peter Barca (D–Kenosha) and Madison Mayor Paul Soglin. On the other hand, Republicans are having no trouble finding potential opponents for U.S. Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D–Wisconsin).
Running against Act 10 isn’t working. Running against Walker — 2014 candidate Mary Burke’s sole strategy was running as not-Walker — isn’t working either. Running against a presidential opponent of unprecedented unpopularity didn’t even work.
I don’t know whether I should be angry or amused or apathetic about this, from Britain’s Express:
European Union boss Jean-Claude Juncker [Thursday] afternoon issued a jaw-dropping threat to the United States, saying he could campaign to break up the country in revenge for Donald Trump’s supportive comments about Brexit.
In an extraordinary speech the EU Commission president said he would push for Ohio and Texas to split from the rest of America if the Republican president does not change his tune and become more supportive of the EU.
The remarks are diplomatic dynamite at a time when relations between Washington and Brussels are already strained over Europe’s meagre contributions to NATO and the US leader’s open preference for dealing with national governments.
They are by far the most outspoken intervention any senior EU figure has made about Mr Trump and are likely to dismay some European leaders who were hoping to seek a policy of rapprochement with their most important ally.
Speaking at the centre-right European People Party’s (EPP) annual conference in Malta this afternoon, the EU Commission boss did not hold back in his disdain for the White House chief’s eurosceptic views.
He said: “Brexit isn’t the end. A lot of people would like it that way, even people on another continent where the newly elected US President was happy that the Brexit was taking place and has asked other countries to do the same.
“If he goes on like that I am going to promote the independence of Ohio and Austin, Texas in the US.”
Mr Juncker’s comments did not appear to be made in jest and were delivered in a serious tone, although one journalist did report some “chuckles” in the audience and hinted the EU boss may have been joking. The remarks came in the middle of an angry speech in which the top eurocrat railed widely against critics of the EU Commission.
They will be seen as totally inexplicable at a time when EU-US relations appeared to be on the mend, with Vice-President Mike Pence having completed a largely successful trip to Brussels and the commander-in-chief himself significantly softening his tone towards the EU project.
Mr Juncker did not criticise Britain at all during his speech, and only made reference to Brexit in relation to Mr Trump and the opportunities it presents for Europe to reform itself.
He told the audience in Malta: “Brexit isn’t the end of everything. We must consider it to be a new beginning, something that is stronger, something that is better.”
Speaking before him, EU Council president Donald Tusk was less reserved in his remarks about the UK vote as he tore into the populist politics which led to Brexit.
The Polish eurocrat said the argument over sovereignty – epitomised by the Vote Leave slogan ‘take back control’ – was “a view that is both foolish and dangerous” and that the EU guaranteed countries’ strength of the world stage.
He also accused populist politicians, such as the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders and France’s Marine Le Pen, of promoting “organised hatred” with their views on immigration.
However his conservative colleague Antonio Tajani, the EU Parliament president, received a rapturous ovation as he launched an impassioned defence of Europe’s “Christian values”.
In a series of thinly veiled comments about immigration, a major political issue in his homeland and Malta, the Italian official said Europe should do more to defend its historic identity.
He said: “We shouldn’t be ashamed of saying we’re Christian. We’re Christian, it is our history.
“If we leave our identity we will have in Europe all identities but not European identities. For this we need to strengthen our identity.
“It is impossible to win without identity, without our values. Of course we are different, many languages, many ideas, but we are united on the values and this is the most important content.”
What is a bit jaw-dropping is Juncker’s ignorance of U.S. geography. Texas is a very red state. Ohio is a more purple state. Juncker could have easily said he wanted California and New York to secede and sounded less ignorant, given that most of Hillary Clinton’s popular-vote margin came from those two states.
More importantly: Who is Juncker? The always-accurate Wikipedia says of the EU president:
Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, lays out the procedure for appointing the President and his team. The European Council votes by qualified majority for a nominee for the post of President, taking account of the latest European elections. This proposal is then put before Parliament which must approve or veto the appointment. If an absolute majority of MEPs support the nominee, he/she is elected. The President then, together with the Council, puts forward his team to the Parliament to be scrutinised. The Parliament normally insists that each one of them appear before the parliamentary committee that corresponds to their prospective portfolio for a public hearing. The Parliament then votes on the Commission as a whole and, if approved, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, appoints the President and his team to office.
Who is the European Council? Back to Wikipedia:
The European Council is an official institution of the EU, mentioned by the Lisbon Treaty as a body which “shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development”. Essentially it defines the EU’s policy agenda and has thus been considered to be the motor of European integration. Beyond the need to provide “impetus”, the Council has developed further roles: to “settle issues outstanding from discussions at a lower level”, to lead in foreign policy — acting externally as a “collective Head of State“, “formal ratification of important documents” and “involvement in the negotiation of the treaty changes“.
Since the institution is composed of national leaders, it gathers the executive power of the member states and has thus a great influence in high-profile policy areas as for example foreign policy. It also exercises powers of appointment, such as appointment of its own President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the President of the European Central Bank. It proposes, to the European Parliament, a candidate for President of the European Commission.
What? European Commission? Wikipedia again:
The European Commission (EC) is an institution of the European Union, responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the EU treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the EU. Commissioners swear an oath at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, pledging to respect the treaties and to be completely independent in carrying out their duties during their mandate.
The Commission operates as a cabinet government, with 28 members of the Commission (informally known as “commissioners”). There is one member per member state, but members are bound by their oath of office to represent the general interest of the EU as a whole rather than their home state. One of the 28 is the Commission President (currently Jean-Claude Juncker) proposed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament. The Council of the European Union then nominates the other 27 members of the Commission in agreement with the nominated President, and the 28 members as a single body are then subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament.
What? European Parliament? Wikipedia one more time:
The European Parliament (EP) is the directly elected parliamentary institution of the European Union (EU). Together with the Council of the European Union (the Council) and the European Commission, it exercises the legislative function of the EU. The Parliament is composed of 751 (previously 766) members, who represent the second largest democratic electorate in the world (after the Parliament of India) and the largest trans-national democratic electorate in the world (375 million eligible voters in 2009). …
The Parliament and Council have been compared to the two chambers of a bicameral legislature. However, there are some differences from national legislatures; for example, neither the Parliament nor the Council have the power of legislative initiative (except for the fact that the Council has the power in some intergovernmental matters). In Community matters, this is a power uniquely reserved for the European Commission (the executive). Therefore, while Parliament can amend and reject legislation, to make a proposal for legislation, it needs the Commission to draft a bill before anything can become law.
This was what a majority of Great Britain’s voters elected to depart. You’ve heard the phrase that a camel is a horse made by committee.
Today in 1956, Elvis Presley appeared on ABC-TV’s “Milton Berle Show” live from the flight deck of the U.S.S. Hancock, moored off San Diego.
An estimated one of every four Americans watched, probably making it ABC’s most watched show in its history to then, and probably for several years after that.
Today in 1955, the Louisiana Hayride TV show broadcast this concert live from Shreveport, La.: